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The van Rompuy reforms: Type 1 and type 2 errors and one small bright spot 
Waltraud Schelkle (LSE) and Deborah Mabbett (Birkbeck, University of London) 
 
In our contribution to the Intereconomics forum on ‘Challenges Facing European 
Monetary Union’ earlier this year, we argued that the euro area needed a stabilisation 
fund that would provide some positive incentives for sound macroeconomic 
management as well as some insurance against tides of adverse sentiment in the 
markets, which we saw as procylical and likely to intensify problems of 
macroeconomic stabilisation. We were also critical of the ECB for relying on the 
ratings agencies to tell it which government bonds to accept on what terms. This, we 
argued, was an abdication of the ECB’s responsibility to contribute to euro area 
stabilisation. 
 
The van Rompuy Task Force has not addressed the issue of positive incentives at all, 
but instead has returned to the disciplinarian language of the original Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). In this contribution, we explain why we think its approach is 
flawed. Not only are the proposed sanctions likely to heighten political tensions, but 
also the assessments on which they are based are likely to convict some governments 
of crimes they have not committed, while allowing others to pursue policies that 
worsen the euro area’s growth prospects. We then take another look at the curious 
politics of the ECB. The crisis has seen the boundaries between monetary and fiscal 
policy crossed in several member states: most strikingly in Ireland. As a result, the 
ECB has been dragged into country-specific measures. We suggest that this will be a 
permanent feature of its life from now on, and it needs to find ways to use its 
influence constructively. Finally, we turn to the debate over the crisis resolution 
mechanism (CRM) and argue for once in defence of the German position. Requiring 
creditors to take a haircut when a country has recourse to the CRM could actually 
mean that the markets finally come to provide timely signals to governments that are 
pursuing unsustainable policies. 
 
The errors in the proposed SGP reforms 
The Task Force solemnly proposes a return to the disciplinarian approach that 
prevailed before 2005. The Task Force wants more and earlier sanctions, namely for 
an excessive deficit, debt, and imbalances. The new decision mechanism in the 
Council also makes it more likely that such sanctions will be imposed, as it no longer 
requires a qualified majority to confirm the recommendation by the Commission but a 
qualified majority to reject it (a so-called reverse majority). In the future, sanctions 
may be extended to non-Euro area members although they will not have to pay a fine 
but may not receive certain funds from the EU budget (Task Force 2010: para 18). No 
doubt many small dramas will be enacted under these rules. They will do nothing to 
remedy the economic problems of the euro area and they will also harm the popular 
legitimacy of the Commission, which will be clearly responsible, as never before, for 
punitive actions towards member states.  
 
For the drafters of the original SGP, irresponsible governments were the most 
important potential source of macroeconomic instability, and fiscal deficits and debt 
were the key data to be monitored if the euro area was to thrive. We now know that 
this led to what statisticians call Type 2 errors. Fiscal monitoring did not reveal the 
threats to macroeconomic stability that were bubbling up as the peripheral euro area 
countries enjoyed the effects of low interest rates. Spain, for example, performed 
adequately on the fiscal criteria, whereas stresses might have been identified if 
macroeconomic monitoring had paid more attention to private debt and current 
account imbalances. Conversely, fiscal monitoring could lead to type 1 errors or 
finding a problem where there was not one. Belgium, a persistently poor fiscal 
performer, provides the leading example of that: it has a solid current account surplus 
and, before the crisis, managed to use lower euro interest rates to reduce its debt level 
slowly but surely. 
 
Thus the Task Force is right to propose to monitor the ‘excessive imbalances position’ 
of member states (Task Force 2010: para 37). The list of indicators for such excessive 
imbalances has not been drawn up yet but the report mentions ‘[c]onsumption 
developments, housing bubbles[,] the accumulation of external and internal debt’ and 
‘divergences in competitiveness’ (Task Force 2010: para 32). So it seems that a lesson 
has been learned. But the disciplinarian fervour is yet again prone to rely on irrelevant 
evidence, thereby convicting governments of failures of macroeconomic management 
when they are not, in any meaningful sense, guilty. 
 
The most striking source of potential type 1 errors is the suggestion that 
competitiveness should be monitored. Macroeconomic monitoring should be 
concerned with indicators that can be tackled with macroeconomic policies. Unit 
labour costs (the proposed measure of competitiveness) are a composite indicator of 
nominal wage developments and the evolution of employment (hours worked) relative 
to output. Governments could intervene to manipulate this measure but it is far from 
clear that they should and that they even can in any predictable way. In the capitalist 
market economies of the euro area, it is for firms and wage bargainers to determine 
these variables in the course of searching for profitable business and employment 
strategies, through their negotiations over wages and working time. 
 
The Task Force proposes monitoring ‘imbalances’, but it is clear that it really means 
‘deficits’. Member states with large and persistent current-account surpluses are 
mentioned only once, in para 33, where it is suggested that their ‘policies should aim 
to identify and implement the structural reforms that help strengthening their domestic 
demand and growth potential.’ One cannot but wonder what these structural reforms 
might be: the demolition of the model of export-oriented growth and accompanying 
wage restraint that is apparently so deeply institutionalised in Germany, the 
Netherlands and Austria, perhaps? Seriously, structural reforms are an unreliable way 
to boost domestic demand and will actually make the problem of imbalances harder. 
The tax cuts that liberal-conservative governments in Germany and the Netherlands 
favour might do the trick, and perhaps more spending on social services would not go 
amiss. But of course this cannot be said, because the official EU line is to preach the 
doctrine of universal fiscal consolidation, for everybody to read in the Commission’s 
assessments of stability and convergence programmes. This advice may be right for 
any one country looked at in isolation but it is not constructive advice against the 
background of large macroeconomic imbalances within the Euro area.  
 
It would be much better to convince the governments of surplus countries that it is in 
their own interest to allow the debtors repay instead of competing them into the abyss. 
The surplus countries’ banks and pension funds would then be on the line as well, 
since they hold a good share of the sovereign debt. To suppose that the surpluses of 
one group of countries are caused by good fiscal policy and the deficits of the other 
group are due to bad fiscal policy is to commit both type 2 and type 1 errors at the 
same time. The surplus countries are deemed innocent of responsibility; the deficit 
countries found guilty. This is an achievement of sorts, as statisticians tell us that the 
occurrence of these errors normally varies inversely. 
 
The ECB’s role in the crisis saga 
The monitoring of current account positions will reveal that fiscal authorities are not 
the only force behind unsustainable imbalances. Attention will shift to the growth of 
private debt and booms in bank lending on the back of housing bubbles. As 
economists noted long before the crisis, national governments in the Euro area have 
only fiscal instruments to deal with these problems. Tax policies can certainly have an 
impact on how attractive it is to incur mortgage debt; property taxes or windfall gains 
taxes on housing transactions could also help to restrain bubbles. But it is now clear 
that action should also be taken by monetary authorities. Macroeconomic stability is a 
monetary as well as a fiscal task. Paul De Grauwe (2010) has recently proposed that 
the ECB should accept its responsibility for asset market bubbles and impose, for 
instance, country-specific minimum reserve requirements on resident banks. Of 
course, the ECB will resist the use of country-specific assessments and instruments 
rather than general interest rate policy, as this will expose it to a much higher level of 
political debate.  
 
One lesson of the financial crisis is that not just governments but also banks can 
pursue unsustainable strategies. The model of governance of the euro area, by 
contrast, was based on the assumption that member states’ commercial banks were all 
equally sound institutions, managed according to common banking principles. We 
now know that national differences in banking regulation can have a profound impact 
on euro area stability. Regulators could monitor the strategies by which banks are 
increasing their leverage, restrain the erosion of loan-to-value ratios and control the 
spread of securitisation. They could also rein in loans to housing and construction that 
are based on overvalued collateral.  
 
The ECB is already pursuing country-specific policies. This became apparent in a 
rather peculiar way when the ECB chose to settle unease about Greece’s declining 
credit rating by announcing its continued willingness to purchase Greek bonds as part 
of its own version of quantitative easing. Now, the Irish crisis has revealed another 
role, as it has become clear that ECB loans are supporting the Irish banking system to 
a much greater extent than in any other country. So long as the imperative of 
maintaining liquidity reigned, this was just a small wrinkle on the ECB’s generally 
expansionary stance. But with recovery now underway in the heart of Europe, the 
ECB will want to rein in its asset purchases and lending.  
 
The deliberations of the van Rompuy Task Force, with its huffing and puffing about 
fiscal discipline, are strikingly orthogonal to the Irish problem. The Irish government 
cannot be accused of profligacy in regular government spending; if anything, the 
government has sent the economy into a downward spiral thanks to its pro-cyclical 
austerity programme. Until recently, markets praised the Irish government for doing 
all the things that the Greek government should do. The crucial step that Ireland took 
towards insolvency was to turn bank debts into sovereign debts, by promising to 
guarantee the position of bank creditors. While tough on public sector workers and 
benefit recipients, the government has been lenient towards its political cronies in the 
banking and building sectors.  
 
The crisis makes it clear now that the Irish government must make creditors share the 
losses of insolvent banks, or the resulting burden on Irish taxpayers will burden the 
economy for years. Such burden-sharing is arguably what the Commission has tried to 
do by forcing Ireland to turn to the European Financial Stabilisation Facility (EFSF) 
and the IMF. This intervention saw officials from outside Ireland trying to impose a 
solution in the interests of taxpayers rather than the political elite, which is naturally 
devoted to its ‘sovereignty’.  
 
A standby agreement would also end the present situation where the ECB is abused as 
a printing press to prop up the Irish banking system. It is a bitter irony and a damning 
verdict on the past strategy that this humiliation is inflicted upon the proudly 
independent central bank by a member state which accepts that its sovereignty is 
ceded to market forces rather than shared with the union of which it is a member. Like 
the ECB, the Irish government prefers to let its actions be dictated by the markets 
rather than take advice from other political authorities. 
 
Crisis resolution 
The one bright spot in these depressing stories is the possibility of a crisis resolution 
mechanism, not contained in the Task Force report but apparently under preparation 
on the request of the French and German governments. This mechanism provides an 
opportunity to correct the process whereby the financial markets create debt crises 
which member states can only calm by offering assurances of no default. The German 
vision is that the crisis resolution mechanism will see haircuts imposed on the national 
debt of member states that enter it. This should ensure that markets price in the risks 
of debt being discounted at a much earlier stage than they do now. If markets 
correctly assessed risk, countries pursuing irresponsible fiscal policies should find 
themselves facing an interest rate premium: a more salient and effective deterrent than 
any excessive deficit procedure.  
 
The SGP as it stands prevents rather than supports this deterrent from operating. 
Intrusive fiscal surveillance inevitably declares budgetary policies to be a common 
responsibility and however much Commission and Council insist on the no-bailout 
clause, the markets see the common responsibility – why else would members accept 
the intrusion? At the same time, there is no fiscal substance behind this common 
responsibility, no central budget that could protect a government from being forced to 
austerity when the economy is already in the doldrums.   
 
But it would be preferable and in our view even more effective if the markets would 
impose the haircuts on themselves. This calls for some innovation in public debt 
management. But then these unusual times are the right times for making the case for 
unorthodox measures, as monetary authorities have taught us. Robert Shiller (2005) 
has proposed to link returns on public debt to GDP growth. Bulgaria has already 
experimented with such bond issue. It would mean that if bond markets drive an 
economy into recession, the burden of servicing the public debt would fall as well. 
This would make for a smoother pricing in of evolving risks to which countries can 
adjust instead of being pushed into crisis and towards default. Such a mechanism is 
not a silver bullet but would help to suppress the destabilizing dynamic of high 
interest rates and low growth.  
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